Chapters 3 and 4 of AV
On the up side, this gets us out of the relentless discussion of Emotivism. I am not entirely sure that I understand why Chapter 3 was written. I assume that this will be used as a target to attack later, but I think that we got all the value out of this discussion in chapter II.
The argument goes:
"We have lost the ability to takel about morality, incommensurate (Ch I)."
No this has always been the case, I am an Emotivist
"OK, the Emotivist world looks like this"
OK, so what
Is MacI trying to say that this is proof that the Emotivist society is NOT something that always was? It seems like chapter 3 is a lot of overkill to make that fairly easily granted point.
I hope that he is going to use the paradigms set up in this chapter to pick out qualities of older moralities that had it together(?) or what our new goal should be (?).
Chapter 4 was pretty good. A lot tighter / faster moving. It basically gives the specific instances in Kant, Kierkergaard, and Hume of how the Enlightenment project of answering rationally "Why should I be moral" failed. He also asserts a close similarity between the Enlightenment (which asked the same question we ask, but they did it first) and today. They asked the question that we, 300 years later, still have not addressed.
Chapter 5 promises the essential flaw that guaranteed failure, but I'm still reading it. -- steven
Chapter 3: Emotivism: Social Content and Social Context
Synopsis: Do we live in an
I. Since G.E. Moore, the moral philosopher has not had the
obligation to expalin the social implementation of his proposition (p.
II. Emotivism's social content obliterates the difference between
social minipulation versus genuine (non-manipulative) relations.
preference-based, you are always
B. You are always treating others as means and never as ends in
themselves (ref. Kant)
III. What would an Emotivist world look like?
amusement (or manipulation for their betterment, but we can't tell the
difference) like in Portrait
of a Lady
B. A w orld with boredom as the enemy and the world as a market
of subornable wills to be manipulated
C. This notion tends to surface in classes with too much leisu
IV. The corporation embodies the Emotivist ethic
for the prey to use (in previous section), the corporate manager is
praised for 'using.'
B. The paragon of this idea comes from Weber
C. Battles between competing values cannot be resolved.
D. Difficulties are resolved by appealing to 'efficiency' - which
really serves only to strengthen the ethic that people ought be used
E. Weber's distinction between 'power' and 'authority' (where
'authority serves faith, promises) is false, no authority exists but <span
style="font-weight: bold;">effectiveness</span>, which only serves to
V. Example: Weber's explanation of the justification of managerial
authority hinges on the manager controlling behavior and supressing
conflict - thus strengthening the authority of power.
VI. The rich aesthete and bureaucrat are <span
style="text-decoration: underline;">characters</span> in our socal
collective stage (27)
B. From characters, society gets its bearings
C. Their actions are constrained
E. Culture of an era can be defined by the menangerie of
VII. Characters are the moral representatives of their culture
by the moral philosopher.
B. Characters embody moral beliefs
C. Moral philosophers onform the lives of characters in a
(a collection) and roles
possess moral beliefs but each does so in its own unique fashion
IX. Individuals express moral belief via their action.
X. Roles' beliefs tdo not necessarily match with the belief of
the individual (a union leader may think that a union is a false
concession to capitalism that is staving off the revolution)
XI. Characters fuse the possible delta between role and
personality and legitimates a mode of social existence.
XII. Individuals define themselves in terms of these characters.
XIII. THe Therapist is another character whose power comes from
his legitimation via effectiveness
XIV. The self is not a collection of social modes, the self has a
rich history apart therefrom
XV. THe motivist self cannot be identified with any particular
moral point of view as evaluation has no criteria
judgment on anything. It can stand back from every situation.
B. Anyone can be amoral agent (defined as the ability to stand b
ack), but only a few can be characters
C. The Emotivist self can be entirely removed from its socila
D. All moral attitudes are plaything between which one can
XVI. The self exists:
B. Without having a rational history of attitudes
C. Without a social identity
XVII. The ability to judge actions vanished somewhere and was
celebrated as a liberation
XVIII. The emotivist self pairs in a culture with characters in
XIX. Total Freedom and Total Bureaucratic direction are intolerable. -
XX. The Emotivist self is the end result of a historical
developement under which the language of morality changed as well.
I will chart this.
Chapter 4: THe predecessor Culture and the Enlightenment Project
of justifying morality
I. The social history that created this ill state were episodes
in the history of philosophy and that...
these moments that the present Emotivist society can be understood
B. The reflection of society / philosophy in each other is
II. Our two divisions of social life and academic philosophy find
root in a culture where philosophy was integrated with life: The
B. Equivalence between Enlightenment and France is false
III. The Enlightement cultures have a relationship between the
assertion of a sentence and its tokenized 'use' or 'utterance'
IV. Moral, as we use it, was an entirely new invention in the
of conduct which are neither (theological / legal/asthetic) are allowed
a cultural spac9e
B. Moral opposes theological while asthetic opposes legal.
V. We will run the history backwards from <span
style="text-decoration: underline;">our</span> incommensurate position
to its first formation. We start with Kierkergaard's <span
style="text-decoration: underline;">Enten - Eller</span>
VI. Enten -
Eller has three central features
tied to the thesis
between the ethical, asthetic, and judgment
2. Asthetic = Dionysian = Torrid Passion
Ethical = Appolonian = Marraige
3. We cannot roselve agreement between the asthetic and ethical
without first principles.
4. The position that one will choose the ethical owing to the
force of the consideration of it is unconvincing
B. Deep internal inconsistency
principles have authority independent of the modes of the passions -
whence comes this authority?
2. We give the
principles of ethical living their force by choice .. by an <span
style="font-weight: bold;">aesthetic</span> action
3. K. contradictions and we are wioutht reasons to give the
4. ...Well, K. makes an appeal to God's authority for
justification of the ethical, we don't buy that though
C. A conservative and traditional account of the ethical
a plurality of ethicals
2. Kierkergaard is secretly pining for Kant's ethical
D. Ultimately, Kierkergaard's attempt to justify the ethical
ratinoal, they must be the same for all rational beings
2. If said rules bind all, then <span
style="text-decoration: underline;">the will</span> to follow the rules
is mor important than the ability to do so
3. Thus the goal is to find the test by which a maxim can be
found to be an essential expression
B. What is Kant's conception of the rational test and whence
happiness. Our valuation of happiness is too shifting
2. An appeal to God's law is not tolerated. If we are
trying to explain by appeal to rationality, and ultimately reach God, we
must encompass His rationality, not possible
C. Kant sees the basis of the ethical in <span
style="font-weight: bold;">reason</span>, Kierkergaard saw it in <span
style="font-style: italic;">a priori</span> true, depending on nothing
2. Can we consistently will that all people follow the principle?
3. This is overvague as it vindicates trivial maxims (Always eat
shellfish on Mondays in March)
4. Treating all as means is consistent as and passes Kant's
reason test maxim - but we come up with a world Kant did not want at all.<span
D. Kant fails
VIII. Hume and Diederot
response to this du's appeals to desire and the passions
B. Their appeals produce Kantian morality's content. If we
take a long-
term view and use desire (versus reason or choice) we come up with a
moral society looking like Kant's
C. Diederot's "Rameau" replies:
if the now is sufficiently pleasant
2. Isn't following the rules judged as the result of one single
3. Are we not in effect, as agents pursuping their happiness,
preying upon one another
D. How do we weigh competing desires?
E. Hume cheated by bounding his "passions" to "the passions of
IX. The success of Hume damns Kant and Kierkergaard and their
success damn Hume
X. Meanwhile back at the ranch, the public did not realize
what they had lost.
XII. We proceeded from ethical behavior from appeals to the
passions, to reason, to choice, but have did not find the firm footing
for a rational justification of morality that we would have hoped
for. The Enlightenment rational morality project failed.
XIII. Why was this project doomed to failure from the
start? Next chapter.