Archive for the ‘Philosophy Proper’ Category

This whole Danish cartoon thing…

Tuesday, February 14th, 2006

capt.kar10202141228.pakistan_prophet_drawings_kar102.jpg

Original Caption: Pakistani donkey owners take part in rally to condemn the publication of cartoons depicting Prophet in Karachi, Pakistan.

Dear Fundamentalist World,

We don’t care. In fact, we anti-care. We’re not really insulted, we’re somewhat bemused. Were this same activity done on the streets of Los Angeles we might call it performance art.

This is what we call a free press. Try it out some time, it’s kinda fun.

Yours,

Western Liberal Society

A bit of Christmas eros

Thursday, December 22nd, 2005

“There is always a need for intoxication: China has opium, Islam has hashish, the West has woman.” André Malraux (1901-1976) MAN’S FATE

Murder

Thursday, August 4th, 2005

Many people consider that the reason murder is so wrong is because you have deprived another being of all the potential in their future.

Others feel that because a person has dependents, murdering someone causes a web of damage throughout the community.

Both of these assertions lie at the heart of the liberal understanding of jurisprudence as pertains to homocide.

But to see a dependent in the arms of the man you kill, to realize you will unalterably change their future, and to do it anyway - for no good reason.

[LINK]

Then, my friend, what use has a society of one such as this? None, hislife should be forefit: jail or death penalty, whichever is cheaper for the tax payer and more painful for you.

That said, I’m anti-death penalty in this world, but I’m pro-death-penalty in the Platonic world, where evidence is complete, and the enacting of the penalty is not enmired in our process - yes all that despite my “liberal” views on most things.

Frustrated, and wanting Kant

Saturday, June 25th, 2005

This evening I was in downtown MV and headed by the half-price bookstore, Book Buyers. While retrieving my bag from the counter (they didn’t have what I wanted) a harried woman came up behind me.

She was having trouble locating the philosophy section and asked for a book by “Eee-manuel Can’t. K-A-N-T. I’m looking for it and I can’t find it.”.

I had to restrain myself on two counts:

  1. She can’t find a book by Kant. h0 h0 h0! Being a bit harried I’m sure she wouldn’t have appreciated it.
  2. Butting in and asking which work she was looking for and trying to be of assistance.

A quick aside, I don’t mean to be snobby about her pronounciation, it’s probably a strange effect of my mutated head that I can’t conceieve of not saying it “Eye-manu-el Cahnt”.

In any case, the young lady behind the counter offered some directions and the harried lady shot off towards an uncertain fate searching for some Enlightenment-era Enlightenment from the Professor of K?nigsburg. I had to wonder what sort of maddening urge would drive a person to come in, so harried, in pursuit of a Critique (or two).

Clerical Errors for Clerics

Tuesday, May 10th, 2005

In light of current research [LINK] it appears that 666 is not actually the number of the beast, it’s 616.

Often when discussing the Bible with my father I took the position something like this:

What’s so special about that book? It’s a collection of folk tales that happened to get on the most powerful broadcast medium of its day (the Roman news network). Had the Apache been in Judea, it might be in The Great Sprit we Trust. Pretty much every tribe has written a story about how they were the first, most beloved by God, deserve to have the good land, etc. What’s so special about the tribe of Israel? I mean the Bible was assembled by men at a conference, it’s not like *poof* a big hunk of scrolls dropped from the sky. Most of the books weren’t written at the time the people involved in the stories lived. And the extent of writing by the most focal character in the New Testament seems to have circles in the dust! [which I actually sorta like, but that’s a discussion for another day]”

My Dad would counter that one would have to believe that the book were assembled under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. That instead of this conference being a boondoggle to go to Nicea and hang with similarly-minded people (I doubt the modus operandi of conference attendees has changed much in the last dozen centuries), this conference was different thanks to the unseen hand of the Spiritus Sancti.

This recent discovery would seem to undermine my Dad’s position.

Dad’s position can be logically expressed as:

“The assemblage of all text produced at the Council of Nicea is known today as the Bible.”

“For all texts selected at the Council of Nicea it was done under the guidance of the Holy Sprit”

“For all objects, if it is produced under the guidance of the Holy Spirit it is perfect.”

“For all objects, if it is perfect, it is true.”

Now, the news of the day is:

“There exists a fact in the Bible that is wrong.”

And we come to the uncomfortable position that either the Holy Sprit allowed man to be deceived or that there’s no good reason to believe that the Bible is flawless. This, of course, is nothing new to philosophers who recognize this as a permutation of The Problem of Evil.

Now the question as to whether God (i.e. the Holy Sprit) would allow man to be decieved is at the heart of Descartes’ meditations. Descartes loved God so much that he couldn’t allow God to be a deceiver (ironically enough, he had to obfuscate this position because he was afraid the Catholic Church would burn him for saying there was something God couldn’t do). I’m willing to side with Descartes on this one, anything worthy of the apellation “God” doesn’t go around like the petty Olympian Gods machinating to fool mortals.

By my own setup above, that means I have to accept my position that the Bible is a dusty book of folk tales, inspirational stories, tribal wisdom, tribal chauvanisms and propaganda (“Israel is the best! You get here, we’ll do the rest! Beat Nineveh for the Homecoming Game!”), and the story of a remarkably benevolent man who claimed to be the actual son of God and was nailed to a tree (thanks Douglas Adams!) for being a traitor to the empire.

I hasten to add that I’m not advocating the wholesale discarding of this book. For one thing it’s too culturally significant, it defines what it is to be Western in many ways. Secondarily, the power and comfort people find in this book is in no way lessened due to the fact that it wasn’t flawlessly assembled. Mankind evolves his relationship to his diety(ies) every day he continues existing [1]. That that relationship should evolve in custom, speech, practice and text is perfectly appropriate!

Nevertheless I think we stand at a new era of religion. The Protestants got rid of the the excessive and bloated machinery of the Pope’s fleet of intercessors in favor of the printed word’s relation with the worshipper. In the maw of Naturalism the Catholics reach for The Virgin as intercessor. In the maw of Naturalism the Protestants (best captured in American literature esp. Nathaniel Hawthorne) reached for The Word itself. This begat an unholy and unhealthy logocentrism - an overimportance of the words and the sentences themselves. It’s no accident that the study of structuralist philosophy began in divinity schools as the pious sought to wrench every bit of understanding out of the sentences themselves (i.e. Schliermacher).

But if the book is just as I’ve said it is, a dusty book, and the fascination with the words therein an obfuscation of the essence of its content, just as the machinery of the Catholic institutions obfuscated the spiritual content of the religion according to the Reformation, then what I’m proposing is something akin to a “second reformation.”

We could get rid of our obsession with words (logocentrism) and get back to a primary spiritualism (that certainly would be welcome in the form of a Christian variety of course!) that is faith plus nothing in pursuit of gnosis.

When people can’t rabidly attach themselves and their logocentrism to dusty books, fundamentalism suffers (John Ashcroft and Osama bin Laden, watch out), and the spirituality that’s at the heart of religion blossoms again within each practitioner. It could be a religious renaissance, an 1800 year detour righted. In this sense The US Constitution is superior to the Bible; by being a series of principles it guides by generality and rules by its spirit. Dusty old book religions guide by the particular and (largely) hide the higher spiritual law of the actual practice.

Now I’ve taken Christianity to task a bit in this posting so let me clarify a few points. Far from the destruction of the Christian religion, I’m advocating a purification and a rebirth. When we’re no longer slaves to the social customs of the religion (selling of indulgences, papal courts) or the logocentric fascination-unto-distraction of the text (post-Reformation), we’re able to return to what spirituality is about: transcendence, communion, growth, and the flourishing of the human spirit.

We can be free and closer to God, if we want.


Update: I realize that, reading this, one could think that my father is a dogmatic sort of fellow. In fact he absolutely is not. He never asserted this position as a “that is the way it is” he asserted this position as a Jehova’s advocate to my line of reasoning.

Incidentally, the church knows well the stakes of making something that can be materially disproved part of their “one and only eternal truth.” This is why the stakes were so high for Giodarno Bruno (burnt by the Church for dogma’s sake), Galileo, and Copernicus.

The church had, as part of its one true, eternal, immutable teachings taught that the Earth was the center of the universe. When the heliocentrists espoused their view (backed by observation) the Church realized that this questioning might not have an end. If the material content of the bedrock book of the church can be held dubious, where does the questioning end?

Footnotes: 1. Aldous Huxley amusingly described this “We create our gods, our gods then exist outside of us, but yet we make them move” phenomenon by having the scarecrows in the fields in Island be made to be look like dieties. The image and story of the Buddha / the Christ / the X is a product of mankind, thus we “create” the god; then that story achieves immortality and the tellers die, and thus the god becomes immortal; yet it is human attribution that makes the gods move and act, so even now that the story surpasses the teller, it’s only by our attribution of activity to a god that it actually lives.

This phenomenon is something that the Greeks realized early. It would be a fruitful area of research as graduate work and is what I referred to in this previous post.

Jacques Derrida died on the 8th

Wednesday, October 13th, 2004

Derrida was one of the lit-crit, Post-structuralist philosophy icons landmarks that defined English programs from the 80s to the present day.

Derrida was consistently interested in finding out where what we see of the world came from. What are the filters that pre-evaluate our data for us? There are a whole lot of ivory tower buzzwords associated with Jacques and his interest but I’ll not play party to toying up my own pedantic sycophantic philo/lit-crit snob reputation by using them here. [Wikipedia Entry]

Derrida, as he expresses in his biography/documentary, Derrida, became interested in how people see the world through filters as an French child growing up in Algeria. It was his countrymen’s brutal occupation and racism that pushed him to consider and re-consider how people think not at the psychological level or the neuroscientific level, but as manipulators of symbols of communication.

What is the power of a racial slur? What does this building say about our culture (an extension of Foucault), etc.

One of the great pleasures I had in my education was hearing Dr. Louis Mackey (star of several Richard Linklater films) lecture on the moral systems of the the deconstructionist school viz. Kirkergaard’s conception of morality (i.e. the battle between “the ethical” and “the aesthetic”).

{ Aside: Alasdair McIntyre of Notre Dame once said something I’ll never forget: The choice between the ethical and the asthetic is not the choice between good and evil, it is, rather, the choice as to whether or not to view the world in terms of good and evil }

The last thing is that he was a philosophical rascal! Too ofter the post-modern crown are people with edgy glasses and turtle necks (Outfits by Steve Jobs) and don’t seem to be able to laugh at their discipline. Ed Allaire once said about philosophy: “The car’s been broke for 3000 years and yet everyone keeps working on it!” Derrida never got so caught up. When people he was arguing with would start to take their position too seriously, he would enter jester mode and break up their puffed-up positions.

An example is, when in an argument with Searle about signification, Searle had done some copyright voodoo to prevent citation of a piece of text. Derrida then took the copyright notice itself, and applied his theory to it. He does this in the book Limited Inc.

He was a real fun read. Farewell!

HAL 9000 was into virtue ethics

Wednesday, September 17th, 2003

HAL: I am putting myself to the fullest possible use, which is all I think that any conscious entity can ever hope to do.

After Virtue: Reflections

Friday, August 22nd, 2003

I really enjoyed reading AV, although it took me quite a bit of time to work my way through it. A summation of the book would be this. We live in an era where we cannot rationally come to consensus about moral debate. We do this because we have symbols that relate to moral notions (‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘unjust’) but the moral concepts that give ‘gravity’ to these symbols have been lost. Instead we manipultae their symbolic ghosts, without the weight of true referents.

Mac. traces our modern conundrum to a breakdown in the Enlightenment era. The question that he asks, via Nietzsche, is wether or not moral societies ever existed (Nietzsche thought not). Mac finds the ideal culmination in the Aristotelian model of Athens which reconciles the problem in the Heroc, Sophoclean, and Sophist models. Mac then traces Aristotelianism’s fall from fashion and then exposes its key premises. He then asserts the key principles that must be enacted to encourage an Aristotelian Renaissance.

He lastly says that knowing this will enable to carry the flame of moral discourse through the dark ages looming over us.

Here are some of my favorite notions:

  • Library with incomplete knowledge analogy
  • The failure of The Enlightenment
  • The notion of a practice and acting for quality’s sake

Good book and thanks to Maureen for encouraging me to read it.

An Astounding Quote from After Virtue

Monday, August 18th, 2003

The choice between ethical and asthetic is not the choice between good and evil, it is the choice to choose in terms of good and evil.

Alasdair MacIntyre

After Virtue: Notes for Ch. 1 and 2

Monday, August 11th, 2003

Notes for Chapters 1 and 2

For more data follow the link:

Notes on After Virtue by Alasdair MacIntyre

Chapter One:  A Disquieting Suggestion


Synopsis: 
MacIntyre opens up with the suggestion that the entirety of moral discourse today is like that of a purely aesthetic manipulation of symbols without and understanding of of the relationship between the signifiers of moral discourse and their signifieds (see de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics)Just as if all the scientific knoweldge in say physics were lost, but we kept the theory of relativity, we could speak of ‘relativity’, but not truly know anything about it.  This is disquieting to him.

I.  We have lost the actual referred in the discourse over morality
A.  The beliefs presupposed in discussing these unbound signifieds are not understood
B.  The terms would appear arbitrary, nonsensical
C.  (Analytic) Philosophy, as a tool which presupposes the sensibility of that being discussed, as a language of meta-discourse, could not reveal the error
D.  Phenomenological philosophies (Hegel) could not reveal the error either (same trap as in C)
II.  The current state of loss is the end product of three historical phases
A.  A period when natural science flourished
B.  When it was corrupted
C.  When it was restored in ill repair (like in our corrupted-science universe)
III.  The historical evaluation will not be neutral.  We must take a normative stance and in Hegel and Collingwood we will find our tools.
IV.  If we have in fact entered into an era of non-discuss-ability (of Simulation), then we must be able to mark the shift in the academic study of history; unless the breakage occurred before the birth of the discipline - in which the very language to discuss the crisis would be gone.

Chapter Two:  The Nature of Moral Disagreement Today and the Claims of Emotivism

Synopsis:  MacIntyre asserts that moral argument today has fallen into a state characterized my interminability.  He believes that this interminability is  development and is not the effect of moral discussing having always been interminable by definition (which is the philosophy of Emotivism).  MacIntyre goes to great lengths to show it to be a theary of use, not meaning, and show it to be false.  MacIntyre cannot abide this philosophy as it would render the project of this book pointless.

I.  The nature of disagreement today’s most striking character is its nseeming interminability.  the ability to achieve moral agreement is gone
A.  The interminability is characterized by 3 characteristics:
1.  Conceputal Incommensurability (p. 8).  While logical, the conclusions can be made to follow from the premises, the premises cannot be evaluated objectively against each other.  Lacking objective criteria, one cannot publicaly advocate in a convincing manner.
2.  These arguments purport to be impersonal, thus rational, thus appearing to a rational rubric
3.  Aside:  We claim incommensurability, yet we also claim an appeal to a rational order?  Surely these claims are antithetical!?
4.  We take moral discussion out of historical context and ‘flatten’ it into our time without reference to the culture in which this term flourished
II.  Moral Argument has always been of this type and all discussions on the matter interminable.  This is the philosophy of Emotivism.
A.  The claims of Emotivism
1.  Emotivism is a philosophy about the meaning of the sentences which are used to make moral judgments (p12).
2.  All moral judgments are nothing but statements of preference akin to “I think this is good” is equal to “I prefer this to other options.  There is an equivalence between “X gives me pleasure” and “X is good” as they both mean the same thing.
C.  Emotivism fails as a philosophy of meaning
1.  Due to circularity.  A person says:
“X is good” - This is a statement of approval.
“What kind of approval?”
“Moral approval.”

2.  As a theory of meaning, tries to equate two utterances that have distinctive functions.  When I say “X is good”, I am appealing to a higher force, an impartial higher appeal.
3.  As it fails to address the preceeding discussion, it must be incomplete as a theory of meaning
4.  It asserts that sentences reveal their meaning plainly.  This is not so, the meaning of a schoolteacher shouting “Seven and Seven is forty-nine!” means nothing about arithmetical fact, but means, “Study Harder.”
5.  It obscures use and meaning utterly
6.  Attitudes are not expressed by meaning, they are expressed by use.
D.  The claims of Emotivism Part II: Emotivism’s tenets (G.E. Moore)
1.  Good is indefinable based on a convention or an intuition.  ‘X is good” is similar to ‘X is yellow’.  By what grounds is this truly ‘yellow’ or ‘good’ ?
2.  Moral judgments hinge on utilitarian evaluation.  The most ‘good’ is ‘best’ based on these intuitions
3.  The ‘best’ pursuit is conteplation of the beautiful and friendship
E.  MacIntyre attacks these tenets
1.  There is no logical necessity between the 3, they are merely 3 assertions.  One can be an intuitionist and not be a utilitarian. 
2.  D1 is false and 2/3 are highly contentious.
3.  This is rhetoric to justif a pre-subscribed belief
4.  the ability to identify “better” moral choices, as is demanded by the utilitarian model, falls apart.  Consider X is in love with Y but Y is non-reciprocal and in love with Z.  What is the better resolution?
5.   The struucture of emotivism precludes its own elucidation, the criteria of the best past is merely an assertion of a preference.
6.  Emontivism is a theory of use endemic to a certain historical period.
F.  Emotivism is a philosophy of decline.  It is ancillary to
Chapter 1, RN II, C.
G.  Emotivism denies that there ever could have been a period that one could have spoken objectively about morality. 
H.  Emotivism has no power in terms of analytic philosophy but it does have incredible cultural power
1.  Emotivism was rejected in terms of analytic moral philosophy - nonetheless it pervades
a.  the terminus of justification always winds up at some fundamental evaluation of personal preference.
b.  (p21, “Secondly”) Analytic Philosophy with an emotivist explanation of morality can achieve no consensus on its mechanics
c.  Analytic philosophy is a study of meaning not use.
d.  There exist analytic philosophies that accept an Emotivist stance despite this.
2.  Emotivism is incompatible with Nietzschean and Sartrian morality. 
a.  They were condemning conventions of morality and stating that it’s method of creation was bourgeois, or infected by Christianity, not that it was impossible to attain.
b.  N. and S’s models were both negative dialectic and not particularly enlightening.
3.  If Emotivist thinking is embedded in all of our institutions, then we may not be able to discuss the problem at all.
III.  Tasks
A.  Describe the lost morality of the past
B.  Answer do we live in a terminally ill Emotivist cultural milieu?


Processes and Sketches

Working out An Error in Equivalence
Why did the Emotivists fail to ask why
  1. “I disapprove”
  2. “That is bad” <==> “I disapprove”
are not truly the same?  OR Why did they not see that “this is bad” has more “force” ?  Their focus on the equivalence clouded the force of utterance 2.  the two utterances mean the same, but their usage shows them to be, in fact, differenct. 


Notes:

I am referring to the principle work of Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, which provides many rich metaphors for the discussion of a system that manipulates only symbols - not meanings.  I’m very intererested in his metaphor of the desert of the real  in terms of this discussion.