Chapter One: A Disquieting Suggestion
Synopsis: MacIntyre opens up with the suggestion that the
entirety of moral discourse today is like that of a purely aesthetic
manipulation of symbols without and understanding of of the
relationship between the
signifiers of moral discourse
and their signifieds (see
de Saussure,
Course in
General Linguistics). Just
as if all the scientific knoweldge in say physics were lost, but we
kept the theory of relativity, we could speak of ‘relativity’, but not
truly know anything about
it. This is
disquieting to
him.
I. We have lost the actual referred in the discourse over morality
A. The beliefs presupposed in
discussing these unbound signifieds are not understood
B. The terms would appear
arbitrary, nonsensical
C. (Analytic) Philosophy, as a tool which presupposes the
sensibility of that being discussed, as a language of meta-discourse, could not reveal the error.
D. Phenomenological philosophies (Hegel) could not reveal the
error either (same trap as in C)
II. The current state of loss is the end product of three
historical phases
A. A period when natural science
flourished
B. When it was corrupted
C.
When it was restored in ill repair (like
in our
corrupted-science universe)
III. The historical evaluation will not be neutral. We must
take a normative stance and in Hegel and Collingwood we will find our
tools.
IV. If we have in fact
entered
into an era of non-discuss-ability (of
Simulation),
then we must be
able to mark the shift in the academic study of history;
unless the breakage occurred before the birth of the discipline -
in which the very language to discuss the crisis would be gone.
Chapter Two: The Nature of
Moral Disagreement Today and the Claims of Emotivism
Synopsis: MacIntyre
asserts that moral argument today has fallen into a state characterized
my interminability. He believes that this interminability
is development and
is not
the effect of moral discussing having
always been interminable
by definition (which is
the philosophy of Emotivism). MacIntyre goes to great lengths to
show it to be a theary of use, not meaning, and show it to be
false. MacIntyre cannot abide this philosophy as it would render
the project of this book pointless.
I. The nature of disagreement today’s most striking character is
its nseeming interminability. the ability to achieve moral
agreement is gone
A. The interminability is
characterized by 3 characteristics:
1. Conceputal
Incommensurability (p. 8). While logical, the conclusions can be
made to follow from the premises, the premises cannot be evaluated
objectively against each other. Lacking objective criteria, one
cannot publicaly advocate in a convincing manner.
2. These
arguments
purport to be impersonal, thus rational, thus appearing to a rational
rubric
3. Aside: We claim
incommensurability, yet we also claim an appeal to a rational
order? Surely these claims are antithetical!?
4. We
take moral discussion out
of historical context and ‘flatten’ it into our time without reference
to the culture in which this term flourished
II. Moral Argument has always been of this type and all
discussions on the matter interminable. This is the philosophy of
Emotivism.
A. The claims of Emotivism
1. Emotivism is a philosophy
about the meaning of the
sentences which are used to make moral judgments (p12).
2. All moral judgments are
nothing but statements of preference akin to “I think this is good” is
equal to “I prefer this to other options. There is an equivalence
between “X gives me pleasure” and “X is good” as they both mean the same thing.
C. Emotivism fails as a philosophy of
meaning
1.
Due to circularity. A person
says:
“X is
good” - This is a statement of approval.
“What kind of approval?”
“Moral approval.”
2. As a theory of meaning, tries to equate two
utterances that have distinctive functions. When I say “X is good”, I
am appealing to a higher force, an impartial higher appeal.
3. As it fails to address the preceeding discussion, it must be
incomplete as a theory of meaning
4. It asserts
that sentences reveal their meaning plainly. This is not so, the
meaning of a schoolteacher shouting “Seven and Seven is forty-nine!”
means nothing about arithmetical fact, but means, “Study Harder.”
5. It obscures use and meaning utterly
6. Attitudes are not expressed by
meaning, they are expressed by use.
D. The claims of Emotivism Part
II: Emotivism’s tenets (G.E. Moore)
1. Good is indefinable based on a
convention or an intuition. ‘X
is good” is similar to ‘X is
yellow’. By what grounds is this truly ‘yellow’ or ‘good’ ?
2. Moral judgments hinge on utilitarian evaluation. The
most ‘good’ is ‘best’ based on these intuitions
3. The ‘best’ pursuit is conteplation of the beautiful and
friendship
E. MacIntyre attacks these tenets
1. There is no logical necessity
between the 3, they are merely 3 assertions. One can be an
intuitionist and not be a utilitarian.
2. D1 is false and 2/3 are highly contentious.
3. This is rhetoric to justif a pre-subscribed belief
4. the ability to identify “better” moral choices, as is demanded
by the utilitarian model, falls apart. Consider X is in love with
Y but Y is non-reciprocal and in love with Z. What is the better
resolution?
5. The struucture of emotivism precludes its own
elucidation, the criteria of the best past is merely an assertion of a
preference.
6. Emontivism is a theory of use endemic to a certain historical
period.
F. Emotivism is a philosophy of
decline. It is ancillary to
Chapter 1, RN II, C.
G. Emotivism denies that there ever could have been a period that
one could have spoken objectively about morality.
H. Emotivism has no power in terms of analytic philosophy but it
does have incredible
cultural power
1. Emotivism was rejected in
terms of analytic moral philosophy - nonetheless it pervades
a. the terminus of justification
always winds up at some fundamental evaluation of personal preference.
b. (p21, “Secondly”) Analytic Philosophy with an emotivist
explanation of morality can achieve no consensus on its mechanics
c. Analytic philosophy is a study
of meaning not use.
d. There exist analytic philosophies
that accept an Emotivist stance despite this.
2. Emotivism is incompatible with
Nietzschean and Sartrian morality.
a. They were condemning
conventions of morality and stating that it’s method of creation was
bourgeois, or infected by Christianity, not that it was impossible to
attain.
b. N. and S’s models were both negative dialectic and not
particularly enlightening.
3. If Emotivist thinking is
embedded in all of our institutions, then we may not be able to discuss
the problem at all.
III. Tasks
A. Describe the lost morality of
the past
B. Answer do we live in a terminally ill Emotivist cultural
milieu?
Processes and Sketches
Working out An Error in
Equivalence
Why did the Emotivists fail to ask why
- “I disapprove”
- “That is bad” <==> “I disapprove”
are not
truly the
same?
OR Why did they
not see that “this is bad” has more “force” ? Their focus on the
equivalence clouded the force of utterance 2. the two utterances
mean the same, but their
usage shows them to be, in fact,
differenct.
Notes:
I am referring to the principle work of
Baudrillard,
Simulacra and
Simulation, which provides many rich metaphors for the
discussion of a system that manipulates only symbols - not
meanings. I’m very intererested in his metaphor of the
desert of the real in terms
of this discussion.
