Archive for August, 2003

What I told Arianna when I met her…

Friday, August 29th, 2003

I told her that “If a true lover of Sophia were to become queen, we should all benefit.”

My inner Athenian was inspired, what can I say?

Yesterday Arianna was in town and I got to meet her and hear her speak. Her presence is incredible, she’s definitely got that quality where you’re sort of hanging on her next word. She was in town to deliver her platform statement. She also autographed a copy of her book How To Overthrow the Government for me.

Unlike other candidates who’s web presence is a total joke (Arnold shows us he can photoshop a pic of he and Maria, but offers no substance - a bit like his candidacy), Arianna is willing to take a stand on the issues and post them. She’s also daring to talk about changing prop 13 - this is very politically risky - but risks are something you gain when you work outside of the broken two-party system.

Ironically, Schwarzenegger’s advisor Warren Buffet has recommended Arnold address gaps in the property tax code - as Arianna plans to do if elected. Arnold seems to balk at the Sage of Omaha’s recommendation. What’s the point in buying the best advisors if you won’t listen? Why would you not take the advice of a guy who’s personal worth is in the range where he could close most state’s budgetary gaps with a single check? I don’t see Schwarzenegger coming out of this political hole unless he starts tackling the issues. If that happens and Arianna is there she’ll run circles around him.

(continue to read about SF Supervisor Matt Gonzalez and my night out)

Am I becoming a political Junkie? Has this screwed up world with Bill Oreilly, Ann Coulter, and The Mullah of Austin pushed me to a new pursuit? (more…)

It’s the Sneak!

Tuesday, August 26th, 2003

I love the character The Cheat, but I find his ancestor, The Sneak to be even better!

The Sneak and Cheat are part of the roll call of the Homestar Runner site. I have to be honest, i thought that the site was majorly stupid when i first started checking it out. Oddly, the more you get “in” on the self-referential in-jokes on the site the funnier it gets.

That and the dialog in my little corner of the cube farm frequently includes H*R-isms, Strong Bad one liners, and songlets. Check it out if you want to get lost in another geeky morass.

So I was talking to my former overseer Bailey about where managerial authority is legitimated from. We agreed that it is self sustaining on its own creation: “the myth of effectiveness.”

He arged that a bad manager will, however, eventually irritate his managed if he is bad, and he will then render himself ineffective.
good as something
I would like to think that but I think there are far too many bad managers to hope that the invisible hand of good management will take care of the issue for us.

We also pursued the question of why virtue ethics societies failed. It seems that as soon as you have a plurality of cultures you’re doomed to fail…

You see this tendency even with the Greek VE cultures. When a barbarian(that is, a non-Greek speaker) arrived they were handled with this very odd treatement as the Greek did not know if the outsider observed themis (a minimal hospitality of civilized peoples). If he did observe themis, then the question still remained as to what his roles were.

In light of not knowing his roles, he could not be determined to be good as something or bad as something. Bailey suggested that as soon as mingling of different cultures happened, the survivability of a virtue ethics culture decreases dramatically.

First, an offender to one (say) city-state’s code could leave to go find survival in another place. i.e. if I hacked off Athenian mores I could travel to Sparta or Thrace and live out my days. If i were bound to Athens, hacking off the community would engender this person is “bad”, this would affect my ability to get food, protection, and would certainly lead to my death. So, it is suggested that:

  1. Access to travel
  2. Access to other cultures

Weakens the survivability of a virtue ethics enclave.

I thien suggested that religion, it seems to me, is the willfull associating of oneself to a teleological end. If I am a Christian you can say “Steven, you are doing bad, as a Christian. If I claim no such affiliation your “Steven, you are doing bad” is subject to the Emotivist query of: “Why? By whose standards?”.

Saturday

Saturday, August 23rd, 2003

So this morning I got up early to pass out Arianna flyers at the newly refurbished San Francisco Ferry Buliding.

It was a lot of fun to stand out there and try to sped the message to as many people as would hear it. I always try to be nice to campaigners when I see them handing out leaflets and I discovered that most people are pretty nice about declining politely.

It was a bit hard because I’m not really that extroverted a person by nature, so this is a bit of a thing that’s outside of my comfort zone. I felt pretty good about this as one lady said that I was a good salesman, guess I emoted correctly. (more…)

After Virtue: Reflections

Friday, August 22nd, 2003

I really enjoyed reading AV, although it took me quite a bit of time to work my way through it. A summation of the book would be this. We live in an era where we cannot rationally come to consensus about moral debate. We do this because we have symbols that relate to moral notions (‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘unjust’) but the moral concepts that give ‘gravity’ to these symbols have been lost. Instead we manipultae their symbolic ghosts, without the weight of true referents.

Mac. traces our modern conundrum to a breakdown in the Enlightenment era. The question that he asks, via Nietzsche, is wether or not moral societies ever existed (Nietzsche thought not). Mac finds the ideal culmination in the Aristotelian model of Athens which reconciles the problem in the Heroc, Sophoclean, and Sophist models. Mac then traces Aristotelianism’s fall from fashion and then exposes its key premises. He then asserts the key principles that must be enacted to encourage an Aristotelian Renaissance.

He lastly says that knowing this will enable to carry the flame of moral discourse through the dark ages looming over us.

Here are some of my favorite notions:

  • Library with incomplete knowledge analogy
  • The failure of The Enlightenment
  • The notion of a practice and acting for quality’s sake

Good book and thanks to Maureen for encouraging me to read it.

Screw Microsoft

Thursday, August 21st, 2003

Well, the reason you’ve not seen updates in the Philolog or here is because the majority of my time for the last two days has been spent helping keep my company’s mail systems on-line while being hammered by yet another Windows virus.

Yet again (and again) due to the horrible security model underlying the inherently insecure operating systems, users all across the Internet have been forced to endure network latency, system slowdowns, mangled mail, and missing mail. Thanks for dicking us over, Microsoft.

I took a look at their security tips site which addresses how to maintain your PC / Systems (i.e. patch them, update their scan files) but what are we supposed to do when systems not under our control are leveraged against us? Answer: We can’t do a damn thing, we trust you bozos to do your job and write secure software.

See, this virus took unprotected computers, united them, and then directed them to repropagate themselves. Ever hear of SETI@Home - harnessing millions of computers to work on a problem (in this case processing files to see if there were signs of intelligent life)? Imagine the same style of distributed computing structure attacking a mailing address.

No amount of patching or firewalling could have fixed this - only Microsoft creating an operating system that uses a decent security model could have.

On the up side, no problems on my Mac or my Linux / Unix machines - well except they had to suffer many, many virus propagated / propagating messages. Then again, as they run on secure operating systems, it wasn’t an issue.

After Virtue: Chapters 5-10

Monday, August 18th, 2003

h3 class=”title”>Notes to Chapters 5-10 of AV

In chapters 5 Mac. addresses the inherent contradictions which assured that any project (Enlightenment Era) which sought to rationally justify morality was doomed to fail.

In Chapter 6 we talk about how the world view must look in light of these failings.

Chapters 7 and 8 talk about the failure of ‘social science’ to provide us a coherent explanation of human behavior.

Chapter nine servs as a bridge as we ask, in light of the failure of social science, ethics persists, where do we go?

Chapter ten starts charting the birth of the Classical (Aristotelian) ethical mode’s genesis with the heroic cultures (Illiad, Oddyssey).

Chapter 5: Why the Enlightenment Project of justifying Morality had to fail

I. The Kant / Kierkegaard / Hume arguments failed due to characteristics in their shared history

A. All share similar moral content, despite divergent tests (don’t lie, marriage is good)
B.  Rational justification is similar, based on human nature and what such a being could reasonably accept
C.  All arguments move from premises about human nature to conditions about moral rules’ authority.

II.  Any project of the variety described in I.C. was doomed to fail. Conception of moral rules 

battles human nature.
III.  Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics serves as both in the Classical (pre-Enlightenment era)

A.  There exists man and man perfected
B.  Ethics gets man between his natural state and his perfected teleological state
C.  Teleologically defined
D.  This is a tri-partite construct and all three parts are required
1.  Untutored nature
2.  Correct nature contingent upon telos
3.  Rational ethics

IV.  This breaks at The Reformation (Protestantism and Jansenism)

A.  reason is not believed to correctly inform man about his true end.
B.  Under this, the tri-partite construction becomes:
1. Untutored nature
2.  Correct nature contingent upon telos
3.  Divine Path - God’s Grace delivers you to this
C. Reason does not understand potential’s relationship to action.
D. Actions are based on nature, custom, and habit.

V.  Signs of weak use of reason among KKH

A.  Reason discerns no essential natures
B.  Reason discerns no teleology
C.  There is no teleological end
D.  Thus, the tri-partite construct looks like
1.  Untutored nature
2.  Correct nature, unmotivated by telos
3.  Weakened reason

VI.  With the telos gone, we cannot make any sense of the tripartite scheme.  Thus the Enlightenment authors inherited an insoluble scheme
VII.  Kant saw the criticality of the telos and his inherent failure.  Moral law cannot be derived from statements about human nature or God’s will.
VIII.  Kant’s statement instantiates the general:  No valid argument can move from entirely factual premises to evaluative conclusions

A. Modify that to evaluative moral conclusions.
B.  Moral utterance changed in the 18th century such as the statement in VII could be understood intelligibly
C.  What if the conclusion follows from the terms used?

IX. The Watch Example

A.  This watch is too heavy
B.  This watch is inaccurate
C.  This is a bad watch (evaluative), against VIII
D.  Factual premises can legitimately yield evaluative conclusions when the object under discussion is a functional object

X.  Arguments following the form of IX are exempt VIII’s burden

A.  The “no ought from is” thesis hold valid except where concerns functional concepts.
B.  Man is a functional concept, similar to watch::good watch
C.  Something in discourse changed to destroy this classical construct and netted the Enlightenment projects’ failure
D.  Man is t fulfill roles that define the extent of good
E. Only when man is prior to and apart from roles is he no longer a functional concept

XI.  “Man is not a functional object is a cataclysmic event.  This breaks classical morality and ruins Enlightenment projects.  There were essential human purposes

A.  To call X good is to say that X is the kind of X that someone would choose who wanted it for the purpose for which X-es are sought (59)
B.  Consider the bad watch, it is bad qua chronometer, but might be sufficient qua weapon to kill a bird
C.  But how do we agree to the purpose for which an X is sought?
D.  Once essential functions vanish, we end the project
E.  Kantian ‘oughts’ are imperatives, not true-or-false statements

XII. Moral judgments as true/false continues today, but sans referent.  Once the truth about moral evaluations was spoken sensibly.

A.  These statements were both hypothetical and categorical
1.  You ought to do X if your telos is Y.
2.  Categorical to all beings pursuing Y (humans, in the case of ethics)
B.  Loose of what they were hypothetical and categorical to, and an Emotivist self (ontologically prior), you are linguistically and practically lost

XIII.  Yet this move was praised.  This was a decisive change with two features

A.  Social and political changes
B.  The invention of the individual.  What were the political and social consequences of this invention?  — Chapter 6



Chapter 6:  Consequences of the Enlightenment Projects’ failure

I. Status in the post-Enlightenment world

A.  Freed self sans telos
B.  Transformed rules of morality
C.  No means to appeal to an telos, validate a rule
D.  Philosophies came about that appealed to the ‘freed self’ or the ‘transformed rules’

II.  Utilitarianism attempts to fix by utility as telos

A. Morality was based on superstition, the true goal is utility (avoid pain, maximize pleasure)
B.  Assumes educated utilitarians, doing well for all.
C.  Mill finds that the man enlightened may not exist and Benthanism’s telos erodes
D.  How do we define happiness?
E. Ultimately happiness is capriciousness informed, these caprices are intuitions
F. These intuitions -> Intuitionism -> Emotivism - moral rules are pure caprice

III.  The Analytics could not buy into the Emotivist project because they were Theory of Meaning, not use.  Thus they tried to legitimate Practical Reason’s rules to save it from the precipice.

A.  Gerwith
1.  Practical reasons == Demonstrably Entailed
2.  Freedom and well-being result are required for rational agency
3.  If you hold the above you are logically committed to them ‘being a right’
4.  Rights don’t exist
B.  The neo-Kantians fail to shore up their supposition

IV.  Both the utilitarians and neo-Kantians escape failure.  Emotivist discourse is the reward for unfettering the self; that same act ruined tho ability to rationally explain moral allegiances.

A. There exists a gap between the meaning of moral expressions and their use.
1.  Meaning is such and such , th enlightenment succeeded
2.  The Emotivist theory of use holds sway, and we are in a paradox
B.  The paradoxical existence
1.  We are autonomous agents, free and unfettered
2.  As we have no means to evaluate moral actions in the Emotivist society, we are constantly knowingly using each other - our society may have evolved to embrace this - chiefly notably by the existence of characters which praise the society where this has happened

V. 3 Uniquely modern moral appeal concepts exist in this strange moral simulation we inhabit

A.  The appeals
1.  Rights
2.  Protest
3.  “Unmasking” (culture jamming, in Wolfe)
B.  Commonalities
1.  They are all factions
2.  They all serve as impersonal rational criteria, but they are not, trying to put an objective stake in the Emotivist swamp
C.  Rights as fiction
1.  Rights oppose utility (a fiction)
2.  Rights and utility appeal to “justice”, another fiction, but by appealing to this notion, we can seemingly objectively validate our mere Emotivist preferences
D.  Individuals fight bureaucratic efficiency (government, WTO, etc.)
E.  Protest is the act of decrying that which has been unmasked, generally a Right versus Bureaucratic Efficiency (Utility)
F.  Protesters are attempting to appeal to an objective moral yardstick when the Utility-culture is part and parcel of that same environment
G.  When the arbitrary shows the arbitrary in another it is unmasked - usually out of desire to cover insecurity about our own failings (Freud)

VI.  Emotivism gave us 3 characters, all of which trade in moral fictions,.  To the end, we model off them and we are damned

A.  The aesthete who will view his punishments as aesthetic forays.
B. The therapist continues despite the empirical worthlessness of their trade having been shown
C.  The manager has his own particular fiction: the appeal to effectiveness
1.  Effectiveness is not morally neutral.
2.  It is inseparable from a mode where you are required to treat people as means
3.  how do you measure efficiency?  What is the difference between effectiveness and long term economy?
4.  Whence comes this effectiveness’ justification - from the character it quickened!
5.  Managerial power trades on a false or indefinable measure.
6.  Managerial science is merely the art of being able to propagate the symbols that perpetuate the belief in managerial science, and thus management, and thus effectiveness, and thus the manager character who affirms our Emotivist world-view.

VII.  We can provide social reality of the character, but not have a value for it (is this manager character fiction any good?).  Like Carnap and Ayer’s God, this manager is a social entity that serves a function, but not not have a genuine objective existence.
VIII.  Summation of current status

A. Emotivism
1.  Pervades social interaction
2.  Allows us to trade in moral fictions
3.  Pervades moral utterance
B.  The bureaucratic manager
1.  Is a moral fiction
2.  The myth of effectiveness pervades modern discourse

IX.  The manager claims law-like knowledge by which social institutions can be modeled

A.  Claims the existence of a morally neutral domain of fact about which he is expert
B.  Claims the existence of law-like rules that are derived from the above

X.  Changes

A.  Fact as a notion has changed, as did value
B.  There was a historical changed that rendered the progression of factual premise to evaluative conclusion false
C.  This shift requires an elucidation of fact, next chapter!

Chapter Seven:  Fact, Explanation, and Expertise

I. Fact is a folk concept

A. All recognition of fact requires some interpretation by the viewer
B.  Perceivers without concepts are blind

II.  Ex planation

A.  Experience (invented late 17th-18th century) as an Empiricist concept
1.  Arose with natural history, natural science, this is odd (why is answered later)
2.  This was intended to resolve the is/seems appearance/reality gap
3.  It makes each experience a closed realm, thus all is
4.  Thus seem/is finds no home
5.  It’s odd because natural history strives to push between is and seems - the earth seems flat but it is spherical
6.  How can a world that posits experience and natural history gel? It cannot.
a.  This view removed Aristotle
b.  Thus we grabbed the erroneous moniker ‘Enlightenment’
c.  Aristotelian science is shunned
d.  Thus we seek a ‘natural history’, i.e. science of human behavior
e.  Given the Aristotelian structure where Natural history and Ethics are fused, NH is removed (81-2)
f.   Man ceases to be a functional concept

III.  We attempt to explain human nature in mechanistic terms

A.  Newtonian model of laws
B.  Quine says that any such science must remove human motivation
1.  Not doing so nets inevaluable premises in predicate calculus
2.  Status of belief is too murky to yield a law
C.  Due to Quine’s remarks, any explanation would contradict Aristotle (Mechanistic human behavior or Aristotle)
D.  Aristotle versus Mechanistic explanation
1.  Aristotle can assert “x is good for humans” as a fact
2.  No assertion about what is ‘valuable’ is made, it simply is
3.  We divorce is and ought

IV.  Something odd happens for the human scientist when he manipulates.  He excludes himself, suddenly he is imprinting his own will - something incoherent is inherent in this model
V.  Our false belief in the panacea of this science was to drive expertise in the bureaucratic realm

A.  People assert familiarity with human science.
B.  The sought-after civil servant
C.  Government intrusion is justified by appeals to competence.
D.  Corporations do the same
E.  Competent managers of social change are said to be managers.
F.  Bureaucrats appeal their right to adjust means and ends efficiently on the basis of scientific knowledge
G.  Bureaucrats justify by
1.  valuation of neutrality
2. claim to manipulative power
3.  It is not coincidental that this is exactly the state of our moral discourse today
H.  Does scientific knowledge justify their claim to power?  …Next Chapter

Chapter 8:  Character of Generalizations in Social Science and their lack of predictive power

I.  Status of social science

A. Articulation of laws has failed
B. Oddly, Social science has not been renounced
C.  Failings
1.  Weak predictive power
2.  Does not produce law-like generalizations
3   Is it effective and we simply missed it (answer turns out to be “no”)

II.  4 maxims produced by SS statements

A.  SS tolerates counter examples and does not insist on p or ~p.  Is that science?
B.  Not truly defined in scope r universality
C.  We cannot apply them as hypotheticals
D.  These are not laws but they masquerade as such

III.  Science comes from philosophy, where does SS come from?  It is ancestral to Machiavelli’s writings

A.  Views
1.  to explain s to invoke law like rules retrospectively
2.  To predict is to invoke a generalization prospective
3.  Progress is the diminution of predictive failure — not being right on the prediction is tolerated
B.  Forturna - despite law like generalization, Fortuna can rend it inexplicably asunder
C. Fortuna’s interference would give tolerance for failure in this art

IV.  This endeavor is failed from the get go as there are p4 sources for unpredictability in human affairs that cannot be overcome

A.  Prediction of radical innovation in the science is impossible as prediction entails discovery
B.  Prediction of one’s actions based off of as yet unmade decisions
C.  Game theory constructs do not map to reality, the assumption of a game comes with a load of pinned variables
D.  Pure contingency:  Had Cleopatra not been so beautiful, no Battle of Actium, etc.

V.  Summation:  We cannot determine human action meaningfully, no science of human behavior is possible, the manager is a social fiction with no explicable strength
VI.  Counter to the 4 sources of unpredictability

A.  Doesn’t the first undermine the other three?
B. No assertion of logical relationship.
C.  No accurate explanation of the latter is possible if the first precludes them.  In any case if the art which asserts the former exists, this problem should be overcome as well.

VII.  There are 4 predictable elements in social life

A.  We understand social guesses, rules of social likelihood (12pm, Grand Central Station, Under the Clocktower)
B.  We know statistical regularities
C.  Human life is fragile
D.  Human life is vulnerable
E.  The enlightenment and Marxists thought that human science could overcome C and D.  This science cannot be and thus these two are predictable regularities

VIII.  Problem:

A.  Predictability is required for long-term achievement
B.  Predictability renders us vulnerable to being used
C.  What conclusions can we derive about the possibility of this human behavior science?
1.  We will not get a law like series of generalizations abut human behavior
2.  It will exist with counter examples - illogically
3.  It will be inscopable

IX.  Back to Machiavelli

A.  Fortuna can’t be overcome
B.  It is Immeasurable
C.  It is permanent - any attempt to be totally effective begets unpredictability

X. The bureaucratic manager expert is bunk

A.  He possesses no secret knowledge
B. It is a contemporary moral fiction
C.  It is a social myth


Chapter 9:  Nietzsche or Aristotle

Synopsis:  Nietzsche destroyed the Enlightenment project first, although he mistook the scope of his critique to be “all morality” versus “the Enlightenment’s account of morality”.  As Nietzsche did not suggest a replacement moral scheme, could we not reject the Enlightenment’s rejection and go back to Classicism, that is, Aristotelian ism?


I.  Morality has only became available for a certain kind of use.  Marxist questions are irrelevant is they ultimately demand: who wields the systems of control.  Ultimately, in this discussion that is always the Emotivist characters.
II.  moral utterance is too vulgar, to accessible, as Nietzsche predicted.
III.  Nietzsche saw that moral language usage is like ‘taboo’ when Cook encountered the Polynesians.  It is inexplicable, powerful, illogical.  We must supersede with an act of Will to “create new tables of good.”

IV.  Nietzsche has no coherent replacement in mind
V.  Weberianism is Nietzsche rooted as we must arbitrarily assert moral tables

A.  A matching sociology comes from Goffman
1. Our utterances do other than they purport
2.  The goal is effectiveness
3. Success is what others deem it, this is central.  not the Aristotelian belief for honor is secondary to virtuous acts meriting such accolades
B.  Nietzsche’s rejects the enlightenment project and takes his rejection to encompass all morality at all time
C.  Was he right to dismiss Aristotle

VI.  Nietzsche and MacIntyre ask what sort of man am I to become

A. I am defined by character by adherence to rules? No way.
B.  We should attend to virtues before rules
C.  We must chart Aristotelianism’s rise, to map this we must start with the Epic Societies

Chapter 10:  The Virtues in Heroic Societies

Synopsis:  Virtues and Virtue Ethics exist in heroic societies where ought is clearly defined within a heroic teleology and sense of obligation

I.  Values are predetermined

A.  basic unit is familial kinship
B.  Role defines imperatives
C.  Actions are equal to character
D.  Virtues
1.  Keep a man able to fulfill expectation
2.  Are actions which his role requires
E.  From courage cascades all other social structures
1.  Friendship
2.  Fidelity, etc.
3.  All are keyed off of the man’s ability to put himself in peril to fulfill the obligations of his role
F.  Morality is the same as the social structure, to live morally was to live.  To stop behaving in the heroic society is to be dead, or a slave, for in those two situations you are obligated prior to your role
G.  Execution of virtuous actions, inevitably, leads to death.  The longer you live, the more friends you have, the more often you must fight to keep your credits and debits equal.  Courage is to accept that you will die as part of this contract.

II.  Contrast to Emotivism, existence in society is essential to selfhood

A.  Particularity and accountability are generated
B. A specific  social structure is required
1.  Universal morality is an illusion
2. We can only experience virtue as part of our traditions, if our traditions don’t keep it, neither do we.
C.  Possessions are justified in terms of being virtuous
D.  Evils
1.  Death : it stops you in your role
2.  Supplication / Slavery:  same as above
3.  To cease to be your social role is to die, morally at the very least

III.  The narrative can tell us what characters therein cannot: i.e. Homer asks can you win, yet lose?
IV.  Two key moral claims

A.  Structure embodies a concept scheme
1.  Requirements by role
2.  Virtues enable fulfillment
3.  courage is the root, in face of death you will not fear it, but give it its due
B.  Heroic social structure is the same as enacted epic narrative

V.  Nietzsche’s characterization of heroic society was self serving to his argument (129)

VI.  We cannot escape our historical forebears
VII.  Epic era’s ties to modernity

A.  Marx said we liked it because it is our civilizational root
B.  Two key questions:
1.  Can a life be framed as win/loss and what would that mean?
2.  Must we use discursive style, or is a narrative form satisfactory … Next chapter

After Virtue: Chapter 3 and 4

Monday, August 18th, 2003

Chapters 3 and 4 of AV

On the up side, this gets us out of the relentless discussion of Emotivism. I am not entirely sure that I understand why Chapter 3 was written. I assume that this will be used as a target to attack later, but I think that we got all the value out of this discussion in chapter II.

The argument goes:

“We have lost the ability to takel about morality, incommensurate (Ch I).”
No this has always been the case, I am an Emotivist
“OK, the Emotivist world looks like this”
OK, so what

Is MacI trying to say that this is proof that the Emotivist society is NOT something that always was? It seems like chapter 3 is a lot of overkill to make that fairly easily granted point.

I hope that he is going to use the paradigms set up in this chapter to pick out qualities of older moralities that had it together(?) or what our new goal should be (?).

Chapter 4 was pretty good. A lot tighter / faster moving. It basically gives the specific instances in Kant, Kierkergaard, and Hume of how the Enlightenment project of answering rationally “Why should I be moral” failed. He also asserts a close similarity between the Enlightenment (which asked the same question we ask, but they did it first) and today. They asked the question that we, 300 years later, still have not addressed.

Chapter 5 promises the essential flaw that guaranteed failure, but I’m still reading it. — steven

Chapter 3:  Emotivism:  Social Content and Social Context

Synopsis: Do we live in an
Emotivism-infected culture



I.  Since G.E. Moore, the moral philosopher has not had the
obligation to expalin the social implementation of his proposition (p.
23).

II.  Emotivism’s social content obliterates the difference between
social minipulation versus genuine (non-manipulative) relations.

A.  If all evaluation is
preference-based, you are always
manipulating someone

B.  You are always treating others as means and never as ends in
themselves (ref. Kant)




III.  What would an Emotivist world look like?

A.  Manipulation of others for
amusement (or manipulation for their betterment, but we can’t tell the
difference) like in Portrait
of a Lady


B.  A w orld with boredom as the enemy and the world as a market
of subornable wills to be manipulated

C.  This notion tends to surface in classes with too much leisu


IV.  The corporation embodies the Emotivist ethic

A.  The wealthy person searches
for the prey to use (in previous section), the corporate manager is
praised for ‘using.’

B.  The paragon of this idea comes from Weber

C.  Battles between competing values cannot be resolved.

D.  Difficulties are resolved by appealing to ‘efficiency’ - which
really serves only to strengthen the ethic that people ought be used

E. Weber’s distinction between ‘power’ and ‘authority’ (where
‘authority serves faith, promises) is false, no authority exists but style=”font-weight: bold;”>effectiveness, which only serves to
strengthen power.


V. Example: Weber’s explanation of the justification of managerial
authority hinges on the manager controlling behavior and supressing
conflict - thus strengthening the authority of power.

VI.  The rich aesthete and bureaucrat are style=”text-decoration: underline;”>characters in our socal
collective stage (27)

A.  Social roles are not identical
to characters

B.  From characters, society gets its bearings

C.  Their actions are constrained

E.  Culture of an era can be defined by the menangerie of
characters


VII.  Characters are the moral representatives of their culture

A.  Characters arce the masks worn
by the moral philosopher.

B.  Characters embody moral beliefs

C.  Moral philosophers onform the lives of characters in a
distinctive way


VIII.  Individuals
(a collection) and roles
possess moral beliefs but each does so in its own unique fashion

IX.  Individuals express moral belief via their action.

X.  Roles’ beliefs tdo not necessarily match with the belief of
the individual (a union leader may think that a union is a false
concession to capitalism that is staving off the revolution)

XI.  Characters fuse the possible delta between role and
personality and legitimates a mode of social existence.

XII.  Individuals define themselves in terms of these characters.

XIII.  THe Therapist is another character whose power comes from
his legitimation via effectiveness

XIV.  The self is not a collection of social modes, the self has a
rich history apart therefrom

XV.  THe motivist self cannot be identified with any particular
moral point of view as evaluation has no criteria

A.  The Emotivist self can pass
judgment on anything.  It can stand back from every situation.

B.  Anyone can be amoral agent (defined as the ability to stand b
ack), but only a few can be characters

C.  The Emotivist self can be entirely removed from its socila
interactions.

D.  All moral attitudes are plaything between which one can
arbitrarily shift.


XVI.  The self exists:

A.  Distinct from social
embodiments

B.  Without having a rational history of attitudes

C.  Without a social identity


XVII. The ability to judge actions vanished somewhere and was
celebrated as a liberation

XVIII. The emotivist self pairs in a culture with characters in
dominant roles.

XIX. Total Freedom and Total Bureaucratic direction are intolerable. -
Solzhenstzyn

XX.  The Emotivist self is the end result of a historical
developement under which the language of morality changed as well. 
I will chart this.



Chapter 4:  THe predecessor Culture and the Enlightenment Project
of justifying morality

I.  The social history that created this ill state were episodes
in the history of philosophy and that…

A.  It is only in the light of
these moments that the present Emotivist society can be understood

B.  The reflection of society / philosophy in each other is
necessary


II.  Our two divisions of social life and academic philosophy find
root in a culture where philosophy was integrated with life:  The
Enlightenment

A.  This is primarily a German /
Scottish phase

B.  Equivalence between Enlightenment and France is false


III.  The Enlightement cultures have a relationship between the
assertion of a sentence and its tokenized ‘use’ or ‘utterance’

IV.  Moral, as we use it, was an entirely new invention in the
Enlightement

A.  “…the sphere in which rules
of conduct which are neither (theological / legal/asthetic) are allowed
a cultural spac9e

B.   Moral opposes theological while asthetic opposes legal.


V.  We will run the history backwards from style=”text-decoration: underline;”>our incommensurate position
to its first formation.  We start with Kierkergaard’s style=”text-decoration: underline;”>Enten - Eller

VI.  Enten -
Eller 
has three central features

A.  Unique mode of presentation
tied to the thesis

1.  K. cannot resolve the debate
between the ethical, asthetic, and judgment

2.  Asthetic = Dionysian = Torrid Passion

     Ethical = Appolonian = Marraige

3.  We cannot roselve agreement between the asthetic and ethical
without first principles.

4.  The position that one will choose the ethical owing to the
force of the consideration of it is unconvincing




B.  Deep internal inconsistency

1.  The ethical is where
principles have authority independent of the modes of the passions -
whence comes this authority?

2.  We give the
principles of ethical living their force by choice .. by an style=”font-weight: bold;”>aesthetic action

3.  K. contradictions and we are wioutht reasons to give the
ethical primacy

4.  …Well, K. makes an appeal to God’s authority for
justification of the ethical, we don’t buy that though


C.  A conservative and traditional account of the ethical


1.  The modern can choose between
a plurality of ethicals

2.  Kierkergaard is secretly pining for Kant’s ethical


D.  Ultimately, Kierkergaard’s attempt to justify the ethical
fails.

VII.  Kant

A.  Central to his morality are
two theses

1.  If the rules of hmorality are
ratinoal, they must be the same for all rational beings

2.  If said rules bind all, then style=”text-decoration: underline;”>the will to follow the rules
is mor important than the ability to do so

3.  Thus the goal is to find the test by which a maxim can be
found to be an essential expression


B.  What is Kant’s conception of the rational test and whence
comes it?

1.  It is not based on return on
happiness.  Our valuation of happiness is too shifting

2.  An appeal to God’s law is not tolerated.  If we are
trying to explain by appeal to rationality, and ultimately reach God, we
must encompass His rationality, not possible


C.  Kant sees the basis of the ethical in style=”font-weight: bold;”>reason, Kierkergaard saw it in style=”font-weight: bold;”>choice.

1.  Practical Reason is style=”font-style: italic;”>a priori true, depending on nothing

2.  Can we consistently will that all people follow the principle?

3.  This is overvague as it vindicates trivial maxims (Always eat
shellfish on Mondays in March)

4.  Treating all as means is consistent as and passes Kant’s
reason test maxim - but we come up with a world Kant did not want at all. style=”text-decoration: underline;”> style=”text-decoration: underline;”>


D.  Kant fails


VIII.  Hume and Diederot

A.  Kant’s focus on reason is the
response to this du’s appeals to desire and the passions 

B.  Their appeals produce Kantian morality’s content.  If we
take a long-

term view and use desire (versus reason or choice) we come up with a
moral society looking like Kant’s

C.  Diederot’s “Rameau” replies:

1.  Why care about the longf-term
if the now is sufficiently pleasant

2.  Isn’t following the rules judged as the result of one single
caprice?

3.  Are we not in effect, as agents pursuping their happiness,
preying upon one another


D.  How do we weigh competing desires?

E.  Hume cheated by bounding his “passions” to “the passions of
reasonable men


IX.  The success of Hume damns Kant and Kierkergaard and their
success damn Hume

X.   Meanwhile back at the ranch, the public did not realize
what they had lost.

XII.  We proceeded from ethical behavior from appeals to the
passions, to reason, to choice, but have did not find the firm footing
for a rational justification of morality that we would have hoped
for.  The Enlightenment rational morality project failed.

XIII.  Why was this project doomed to failure from the
start?  Next chapter.

An Astounding Quote from After Virtue

Monday, August 18th, 2003

The choice between ethical and asthetic is not the choice between good and evil, it is the choice to choose in terms of good and evil.

Alasdair MacIntyre